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I.

Introduction: A Conscious Showdown

C. S. Lewis first learned of the Swedish theologian Anders Nygren’s
Eros och Agape through a female colleague, Dr Janet Spens. Lewis responded with immediate interest. In a letter dated 16 November 1934, Lewis asks her, ‘Can you tell me something more about Professor Nygren’s
Eros and Agape? I haven’t heard of it.’1 Spens then lends Lewis her copy
of the first English translation Agape and Eros: A Study of the Christian
Idea of Love.2 On 8 January 1935, Lewis writes again: ‘You will have begun to wonder if your Agape & Eros was lost forever! It is an intensely
interesting book. I am inclined to think I disagree with him. […] However,
I must tackle him again. He has shaken me up extremely.’3
Lewis was not the first, nor would he be the last, to be shaken up by
this seminal work. As Eric Gregory, a former president of the Oxford C. S.
Lewis Society, rightly notes, Nygren ‘set off a firestorm of scholarly debate
that preoccupied much of twentieth century Protestant and Roman Catholic thought’.4 During Lewis’s lifetime, two influential books were written in
response to Nygren’s theses: John Burnaby’s Amor Dei (1938) and the
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C. S. L E W I S , Collected Letters, vol. II, ed. by Walter H O O P E R (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2004), 147.
The Swedish original, Den kristna kärlekstanken genom tiderna: Eros och Agape, was published in two parts in 1930 and 1936. The English translation was first published in three
volumes in England by SPCK in 1932 (Part I), 1938 (Part II, vol. I), and 1939 (Part II, vol. II),
and as a revised, in part retranslated, one-volume edition in 1953. In their correspondence,
Lewis and Spens must be referring to Part I of the work, since Part II had not been published in
English. Part I, which in terms of length accounts for roughly one-third of the entire work,
‘consists of a study of the Christian idea of love as it appears in the New Testament and in
contrast to the Hellenistic idea,’ and Part II describes this history ‘up to the point where the
problem of “Agape and Eros” finds its natural solution in the Reformation.’ See the translator
Philip W A T S O N ’s preface to Agape and Eros (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1969), xv.
Hereafter all citations of Agape and Eros, using AE for its abbreviation, are from this edition.
L E W I S , Collected Letters, vol. II (see above, n. 1), 153, 154.
Eric G R E G O R Y , Politics and the Order of Love (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
2008), 3 – 4.
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English Jesuit Martin D’Arcy’s The Mind and Heart of Love (1945). By
this time, The Four Loves (1960) had not been published, but D’Arcy had
read Lewis’s earlier scholarly study of medieval love, The Allegory of Love
(1936), describing it as ‘very important’, ‘magisterial’, and in some historical analyses, ‘definitive’.5
Anders Nygren notes Burnaby and D’Arcy’s works in the preface to
the revised English edition of Agape and Eros (1953). He insists that ‘the
reason why these important and interesting works come to different conclusions from my own, is essentially that they start from different premises.
[…] I have found no reason to abandon my original position at any point,
and my work is therefore being republished without alteration.’6 Indeed,
despite these Roman Catholic and also Protestant critiques, Nygren’s antithetical juxtaposition of the ‘selfish pagan eros’ and the ‘unselfish Christian
agape’ became, if not normative, at least enormously influential in twentieth-century Protestant theology. Although this model has since proven to
be somewhat a caricature, Nygren’s theology of love ‘continues to be discussed and disputed today, in works ranging from doctoral theses to papal
encyclicals’.7 Pope Benedict XVI’s Deus Caritas Est (2006) explicitly analyses the relationship of eros and agape in the Nygrenian sense of the
words – without explicitly mentioning Nygren himself, as is customary in
Papal encyclicals when criticism is offered.8
Walter Hooper, the editor of Lewis’s posthumously published works
and the literary advisor to the C. S. Lewis Estate, notes that Lewis went on
to spend years ‘thinking his way towards the conclusions he reached regarding the various natural loves and their relation to Agape in The Four
Loves’.9 To say, as Will Vaus does, that ‘Lewis would not, in the end,
agree with all of Nygren’s views’10 is true but perhaps an understatement.
Although in 1958, just two years before the publication of The Four
Loves, Lewis names Nygren’s Agape and Eros among the theological
books that had influenced him,11 significant points of agreement between
5
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Martin D ’ A R C Y (S.J.), The Mind and Heart of Love: Lion and Unicorn. A Study in Eros and
Agape (New York: Henry Holt, 1947, 1st ed. 1945), 12, 54, 28. As far as I can see, Nygren is
not mentioned in The Allegory of Love (1936).
N Y G R E N , Agape and Eros (see above, n. 2), xiii-xiv.
Brendan W O L F E , ‘Editorial’, in The Chronicle of the University of Oxford C. S. Lewis Society, vol. 7, no. 2 (2010), 1.
For a brief yet insightful analysis of Deus Caritas Est, see Werner G. J E A N R O N D , A Theology
of Love (London: T. & T. Clark, 2010), 161 – 169.
L E W I S , Collected Letters, vol. II (see above, n. 1), 154 n. 3, 538 n. 392.
Will V A U S , ‘Lewis in Oxford: The Early Tutorial Years (1924 – 1939)’, in C. S. Lewis: Life,
Works, and Legacy, vol. I, ed. by Bruce L. E D W A R D S (Westport: Praeger, 2007), 164.
This he relates to Corbin Carnell in a letter dated 13 Oct. 1958. See Corbin C A R N E L L , Bright
Shadow of Reality: Spiritual Longing in C. S. Lewis (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999, 1st ed.
1974), 69. Lewis must have been quite conscious of Nygren at the time of his letter to Carnell
in October 1958. In August that same year, Lewis had recorded the radio talks that later, in
June 1959, formed the completed manuscript for The Four Loves which, in turn, was finally
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Lewis and Nygren – whether on theological anthropology, soteriology, the
doctrine of sin, or the relationship between nature and grace – are scant.
Like Pope Benedict XVI in Deus Caritas Est, Lewis never targets Nygren
explicitly in The Four Loves, but it would eventually include an implicit
and tactful criticism of the heart of Nygren’s project, the denigration of
eros and its separation from agape.12 Lewis also preoccupied himself with
very Nygrenian themes elsewhere in his oeuvre, sometimes in surprising
locations. For instance, Risto Saarinen thinks that Lewis’s mythopoeic novel Till We Have Faces (1956) is even more critical of Nygren than The
Four Loves.13
C. S. Lewis also had good things to say about Nygren. In May 1935,
when one letter correspondent, the American literary critic and philosopher
Paul More, had called Nygren’s magnum opus ‘the last word of the most
abominable form of Protestantism in a straight line from Luther through
Barth’, Lewis felt compelled to object, ‘I don’t fully agree – Protestant is
not for me a dyslogistic term’.14 Writing nearly two decades later, in December 1954, Lewis is able to show candid appreciation of Nygren’s work
in a letter to Mary Van Deusen: ‘The great merit of Nygren, so far as I’m
concerned, was that he gave one a new tool of thought: it is so v. [very]
convenient and illuminating to be able to talk (and therefore to think)
about the two elements of love as Eros & Agape.’15 Lewis explains that he

12
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15

published in March 1960. See Roger Lancelyn G R E E N and Walter H O O P E R , C. S. Lewis: A
Biography (London: HarperCollins, 2002, 1st ed. 1974), 387 – 389.
For an outline of C. S. Lewis’s position in ‘the Nygren debate’, see Jason L E P O J Ä R V I , ‘C. S.
Lewis and “the Nygren Debate”’, in The Chronicle of the University of Oxford C. S. Lewis
Society, vol. 7, no. 2, (2010), 25 – 42. See also Gilbert M E I L A E N D E R , The Taste for the
Other: The Social and Ethical Thought of C. S. Lewis (Vancouver: Regent College Publishing,
2003, 1st ed. 1978), 56 – 57, 122 – 123; and Caroline S I M O N , ‘On Love’, in The Cambridge
Companion to C. S. Lewis, ed. by Robert M A C S W A I N and Michael W A R D (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 154 – 155.
According to Saarinen, need-love and altruism remain properly separate in the mind of Orual,
the heroine of the story. But Saarinen argues that Orual is wrong – in other words, that the
author of Orual is right – for ‘true love does not arise from their separation, but from their
fusion’. Given this, Nygren’s theological position resembles more the ‘Puritan-minded pagan
perspective of Orual’ than Christianity. In fact, Saarinen thinks Till We Have Faces is helpful
in attempting to outline ‘a constructive Protestant alternative to Nygren’s Agape and Eros’. See
Risto S A A R I N E N , ‘Eros and Protestantism: From Nygren to Milbank’, in Gudstankens aktualitet: Bidrag om teologiens opgave og indhold og protestantismens indre spændinger, ed. by
E. Wiberg P E D E R S E N (Copenhagen: Anis, 2010), 344 – 346. Corbin Carnell, making no note
of Nygren, agrees in general: the purification of Orual’s loves and longings is ‘the burden of
the story’ (C A R N E L L , Bright Shadow [see above, n. 11], 116).
L E W I S , Collected Letters, vol. II (see above, n. 1), 165.
L E W I S , Collected Letters, vol. III, ed. by Walter H O O P E R (London: HarperCollins Publishers,
2006), 538. In a later letter to Mary Van Deusen (555), Lewis writes: ‘Is it by some […] confusion N. [Nygren] has got where he is? Still his book was well worth reading: we both have the
v. [very] important idea of Eros and Agape now clearly in our minds, and can keep it after we
have let all his exaggerations fade out of our minds.’ Mary Van Deusen’s letters from Lewis

Does Eros Seek Happiness?

211

is nonetheless forced to say ‘elements’, because he thinks Nygren drove his
contrast too hard, believing them to be mutually exclusive.16
The main purpose of this article is to discuss eros’s relationship to
happiness. This is a theme that has received barely cursory attention in
scholarship on Lewis. Nygren promulgated the idea that eros is by nature
always eudæmonistic, i.e. always seeking the happiness of the lover. In The
Four Loves, Lewis vehemently denies this. Risto Saarinen believes that Lewis’s use of the word ‘happiness’ in The Four Loves is so close to Nygren’s
eudæmonism that ‘the showdown must be conscious’.17 I agree with Saarinen on both counts: the engagement is conscious, and, given its passionate
nature, is best described as a showdown. However, after presenting and
deconstructing it, I shall challenge Lewis’s argument. I will argue that eros
does, as Nygren suggests it does, seek happiness – although not only this.
Perhaps surprisingly, Lewis, despite all appearances, may actually agree
with Nygren on this point. But not on every point. The final analysis will
reveal what I take to be Lewis’s true concern.

II.

Does Eros Aim at Happiness?

The three main characteristics that, for Nygren, define the eros motif
are: ‘(1) Eros is the “love of desire”, or acquisitive love; (2) Eros is man’s
way to the Divine; (3) Eros is egocentric love’ (AE, 175). A ‘eudæmonistic
scheme’ which is ‘decidedly egocentric’ underlies them all (530). According
to Nygren, ‘all desire, or appetite, and longing is more or less egocentric’,
but ‘the clearest proof of the egocentric nature of Eros is its intimate connection with eudæmonia,’ the individualistic pursuit of happiness (180).
‘Christian love,’ on the other hand, ‘is spontaneous in contrast to all activity with a eudæmonistic motive,’ that is to say, ‘is free from all selfish calculations or ulterior motive’ (726).18 For our purposes here, Nygren’s ‘eudæmonistic scheme’ can be broken down into four interconnected claims:
(1) Eros always seeks the happiness of the lover, and (2) this happinessseeking character is morally culpable, because (3) it entails selfish incapability of agapistic sacrifice, and (4) calculatingly demotes the Beloved to a
means to this end.

16

17
18

only came to light in 2000. See G R E E N and H O O P E R , C. S. Lewis: A Biography (see above,
n. 11), 297.
L E W I S , Collected Letters, vol. III (see above, n. 15), 538: ‘But surely in any good friendship of
good marriage, tho’ Eros may have been the starting point, the two are always mixed and one
slips out of one into the other a dozen times a day?’
Risto S A A R I N E N , ‘Eros, leikki ja normi: Rakkauden fundamentaaliteologiaa’, Teologinen aikakauskirja (Finnish Theological Journal), vol. 2 (2006), 172 n. 15.
The ‘eudæmonistic way’ is to have one’s own ‘concerns and interests guaranteed’ (736).
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C. S. Lewis disagrees with all four. In The Four Loves, Lewis means
by eros ‘a state which we call “being in love”; or, if you prefer, that kind
of love which lovers are “in”’ (87),19 a state that Sheldon Vanauken
named ‘inloveness’.20 Lewis’s concept of eros is, thus, not synonymous to
Nygren’s.21 However, the comparison of their eros loves is possible, justified, and fruitful, because Nygren’s denouncement of the happiness-seeking
character of eros is simultaneously a denouncement of the happiness-seeking character of all human love in general – including Lewis’s eros. And
Lewis is quite conscious of this.
To lay the foundation for the following analysis, we are forced to
quote Lewis at length. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, I wish to
show that to a certain – minimal but important – extent Lewis’s argument
depends on rhetoric rather than on logic. Secondly and more importantly,
the question of whether or not eros seeks happiness is complex and multilayered, making simple paraphrases of Lewis’s ideas less helpful – and certainly less interesting.22 Lewis’s argument in The Four Loves is as follows:
‘Eros does not aim at happiness. We may think he does, but when he is brought to the test
it proves otherwise. Everyone knows that it is useless to try to separate lovers by proving to
them that their marriage will be an unhappy one. This is not only because they will disbelieve
you. They usually will, no doubt. But even if they believed, they would not be dissuaded. For it

19
20

21

22

C. S. L E W I S , The Four Loves (London: HarperCollins, 1998, 1st ed. 1969). Hereafter all intext citations of The Four Loves, using FL for its abbreviation, are from this edition.
Sheldon V A N A U K E N , A Severe Mercy: With Eighteen Letters by C. S. Lewis (New York: HarperCollins, 1980, 1st ed. 1977), 29; and its unofficial sequel, Under the Mercy (San Francisco:
Ignatius Press, 1988, 1st ed. 1985), 141, 143, 149.
Several scholars have noted the similarity of Lewis’s ‘need-love’ and Nygren’s eros. See Walter
Hooper’s remark in L E W I S , Collected Letters, vol. II (see above, n. 1), 154 n. 3; Josef P I E P E R ,
Faith, Hope, Love (German original: Lieben, Hoffen, Glauben [1986]), transl. by Richard and
Clara W I N S T O N (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), 209 – 210, 221 – 222; S I M O N , ‘On
Love’ (see above, n. 12), 154 – 155; and M E I L A E N D E R , Taste for the Other (see above, n.
12), 55 – 56. Meilaender is right to remind that to contrast Nygren’s eros and agape with Lewis’s ‘need-love’ and ‘gift-love’ is not entirely accurate for, unlike Nygren, Lewis ‘is not making
a simple contrast between human love and divine love. [...] Both need-love and gift-love are
natural components of human love’ (57). (I would add that ‘need’ encapsules only one element
of Nygren’s multidimensional eros, of which a more comprehensive ‘translation’ would, in fact,
be Lewis’s concept of Sehnsucht, which he calls Joy. Another profitable undertaking would be
to compare Joy with Nygren’s eros vis-à-vis happiness.) In any case, by the helpful ‘new tool of
thought’ that Lewis mentions to Mary Van Deusen (see above, n. 15), he most certainly meant
the ‘need’ and ‘gift’ elements in Nygren’s eros and agape respectively.
Lewis’s outspoken critic, John Beverluis, observes that paraphrasing Lewis is always problematic, not only on points of love. See John B E V E R L U I S , C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion, 2nd ed. (Prometheus Books: Amherst, NY, 2007, 1st ed. 1986), 19 – 20. Beverluis is one of the first scholars to bring up the name of Anders Nygren in connection with
Lewis (59 – 61) and for this he deserves credit. However, he seems wholly unaware of the historical connection between Lewis and Nygren. He simply summons Nygren to the arena to
refute some of Lewis’s ideas, unconscious of Lewis’s acquaintance with (and rejection of) Nygren’s position.
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is the very mark of Eros that when he is in us we had rather share unhappiness with the Beloved
than be happy on any other terms.’ (101–102)

Lewis makes a very strong claim. Not only does eros not aim at happiness, it prefers unhappiness with the Beloved than happiness on any
other terms. Lewis continues:
‘Even if the two lovers are mature and experienced people who know that broken hearts
heal in the end and can clearly foresee that, if they once steeled themselves to go through the
agony of parting, they would almost certainly be happier ten years hence than marriage is at all
likely to make them – even then, they would not part. To Eros all these calculations are irrelevant – just as the coolly brutal judgment of Lucretius is irrelevant to Venus. Even when it becomes clear beyond all evasion that marriage with the Beloved cannot possibly lead to happiness
– when it cannot even profess to offer any other life than that of tending to an incurable invalid,
of hopeless poverty, of exile, or of disgrace – Eros never hesitates to say, ‘Better this than parting. Better to be miserable with her than happy without her. Let our hearts break provided they
break together.’ ’ (102)

Lewis is adamant: ‘If the voice within us does not say this, it is not
the voice of Eros.’
How can we respond to this? Is Lewis right about the nature of eros?
It must be noted that Lewis does not claim that a life of eros is necessarily
free of good things – although he consistently refuses to call these good
things ‘happiness’. For instance, speaking of the ‘playfulness of Eros’, he
writes: ‘And even when the circumstances of the two lovers are so tragic
that no bystander could keep back his tears, they themselves – in want, in
hospital wards, on visitors’ days in jail – will sometimes be surprised by a
merriment which strikes the onlooker (but not them) as unbearably pathetic’ (102). Some merriment, at least, may be involved.
We might ask, is not merriment somehow congenial to happiness?
Even if Lewis thought it was, the passage only shows that merriment can
be a happy by-product of eros, not the thing sought for in itself, not the
force by which eros is driven.23 That the eventual life of eros is not completely free of merriment does not mean that merriment is what eros was
aiming at. The distinction is very important. On the very next page Lewis
yet again denies the happiness-seeking character of eros: ‘[its] reckless disregard of happiness’ (103). It is one thing to seek something, and another
to stumble upon it. Another important distinction is between ‘happiness’
and ‘unhappiness’. A closer examination of how Lewis uses these words in
the chapter on eros suggests possible confusion on Lewis’s part.

23

In fact earlier Lewis had said something to this effect when speaking of pleasure: ‘Eros,
although the king of pleasures, always (at his height) has the air of regarding pleasure as a byproduct’ (L E W I S , Four Loves [see above, n. 19], 91). We return to the element of pleasure at
the very end of this article.
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III.

Conventional and Meaningful Happiness

What does the ‘unhappiness’ that Lewis says eros favours over ‘happiness’ look like? Lewis offers a list of characteristics: ‘[a life] of tending an
incurable invalid, of hopeless poverty, of exile, or of disgrace’ (FL, 102).
Admittedly, the list is grim. Even within these unfortunate circumstances
some good, in the form of merriment, may and often does prevail. Merriment in tending an incurable invalid (‘in hospital wards’), in hopeless poverty (‘in want’), in exile or in disgrace (‘on visitors’ days in jail’). Nonetheless, these are all different states of want. Important factors normally
connected with well-being are lacking: health, wealth, home, and honour.
Or it would be more accurate to say happiness, not simply well-being, involves health, wealth, home, and honour – since unhappiness involves their
opposites.
Health, wealth, home, and honour – is this a sufficient list of elements
congenial to happiness? I will argue that this is not an exhaustive definition of happiness – and Lewis himself probably never intended it to be.
This is, however, Lewis’s explicit definition of happiness. As a technical
term, for now, we may call this kind of happiness ‘conventional happiness’. The implicit rationale of his argument, however, betrays that he is
simultaneously operating with yet another definition of happiness. His eros
does not seek conventional happiness. But despite all appearances, even his
eros aims at happiness of another, perhaps deeper, kind.
Many details in Lewis’s argument come together to suggest that eros’s
relation to happiness (or purported lack thereof) is not as simple as Lewis
presents it to be. Some of these details are noted almost in passing. Firstly,
Lewis admits that most lovers would disbelieve the claim that ‘their marriage will be an unhappy one’ (102). Why would they disbelieve it, if eros
makes no promises of happiness? Secondly, Lewis speaks of ‘the agony of
parting’ (102). Whence comes the agony, if not, in part at least, from an
unhappy prospect of a life without the Beloved? Thirdly, eros, according
to Lewis, says, ‘Better this than parting. Better to be miserable with her
than happy without her. Let our hearts break provided they break together’ (102). By ‘this’, Lewis means unhappiness – unhappiness understood as loss of conventional happiness as described above. Lewis’s use of
the word ‘better’ here is revealing. It is a comparative, posited between
two competing states of affairs. Why is one state of affairs ‘better’ than the
other? Is not ‘better’ somehow congenial to happiness? I think it would be
difficult for Lewis to deny that it is. In many of his works, Lewis himself
ridicules attempts at rooting value judgments in anything but goodness.24
24

See, for instance, L E W I S , ‘The Poison of Subjectivism’ (1943), in C. S. Lewis: Essay Collection
and Other Short Pieces, ed. by Lesley W A L M S L E Y (London: HarperCollins, 2000), especially
658 – 660; and the chapter ‘Invasion’ in Mere Christianity. I thank Grayson Carter for directing
my attention to these.
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I spoke of a second kind of happiness that Lewis (somewhat subtly)
operates with. The answer, whatever it is, to the question ‘In what way
better?’ points the way to a definition of the second kind of happiness. We
may safely assume that in some way it is more meaningful than the conventional kind. This ‘meaningful happiness’ consists of, above all, a life
spent with the Beloved. The prospect of losing this good, the Beloved and
a life spent with the Beloved, is worse than losing other kinds of goods –
like wealth, health, home, and honour.
Lewis says it is ‘the very mark of Eros that when he is in us we had
rather share unhappiness with the Beloved than be happy on any other
terms’ (102). Understood as conventional happiness, the statement is unproblematic: ‘We would rather share [conventional] unhappiness with the
Beloved than be [conventionally] happy on any other terms.’ But based on
our analysis above, in light of the more meaningful happiness which is the
hidden backdrop of Lewis’s argument, it would be just as truthful to say
something strikingly different: ‘We would rather share [meaningful happiness] with the Beloved than be [conveniently] happy on any other terms.’
The profound implication being: ‘We would rather share [meaningful happiness] with the Beloved than be [meaningfully unhappy] on any other
terms.’
It would be tempting to call these two kinds (or levels) of happiness
simply hedonism and eudæmonism.25 Other possible names could be
‘short-term’ and ‘long-term’ happiness, or ‘material’ and ‘spiritual’ happiness, or ‘external’ and ‘internal’ happiness, or ‘acquisitive’ and ‘self-giving’
happiness. These all have their strengths but equally their limits, as some
are obviously misleading and others too vague. We must also accept that
The Four Loves offers no perfectly unambiguous definition. For these reasons I have preferred the more temperate ‘conventional’ and ‘meaningful’
happiness. They are suggestive enough without being rigid.
Nygren is aware that ‘happiness’ is understood in many ways. Speaking of ancient Greek ethics, for instance, he writes: ‘The dominant question
was that of eudæmonia, happiness; and although different answers might
be given – the answer of Hedonism, that happiness is the pleasure of the
moment; or of Aristotle, that it consists in activity and the attainment of
perfection; or of Stoicism, that it is ataraxia, independence and indifference
towards the external vicissitudes of life – yet the statement of the question
remains always the same’ (AE, 44).26 Unsatisfied with these answers, Augustine, Nygren explains, sought for happiness in something more endur-

25

26

For an etymological and philosophical study of eudæmonia, see Marcel S A R O T , ‘Happiness,
Well-being, and the Meaning of Life’, in Happiness, Well-being, and the Meaning of Life: A
Dialogue of Social Science and Religion, ed. by Vincent B R Ü M M E L and Marcel S A R O T (Kampen: Kok Pharos Publishing, 1996), 1 – 23.
See also 501: ‘To this question different philosophical schools had given different answers: the
highest good is the momentary pleasure of the senses; or it is a spiritualised enjoyment of life;
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ing and dependable. This he eventually found in God. In Augustine’s
words: ‘He is the source of our happiness, He is the end of all desire.’27
This famous ‘rest in God’ is not, however, unproblematic. ‘Antiquity
taught Augustine to ask the eudæmonistic question,’ so his answer is ‘simply a continuation of the endless discussion of ancient philosophy about
what is the “highest good”’ (AE, 501). In other words, Augustine simply
substituted a heavenly bribe for an earthly one, which is unfortunate because it ‘implies no condemnation of this egocentric and eudæmonistic
question’ (503). ‘Christianity,’ on the other hand, ‘makes a revolutionary
change […] Agape, or love, is a social idea which as such has nothing in
common with individualistic and eudæmonistic ethics.’ Instead of an individualistic quest for one’s ‘Highest Good’, it becomes a question of ‘the
Good-in-itself’ (44–45).
For these reasons, Nygren is less interested in what kind of happiness
is at stake. It makes no difference, and he commits himself to none in particular. The problem for him is the pursuit of happiness itself, which as a
necessary constituent of human love is essentially flawed and morally culpable. Despite his protestations, incredibly enough, Lewis in fact agrees – or
is compelled to agree – with part of this claim. Lewis’s eros pursues happiness, insofar as we mean a truly ‘meaningful’ kind.

IV.

We Have No ‘Right to Happiness’

The Four Loves was published in 1960, three years before Lewis’s
death in November 1963. The last thing he wrote is an aptly titled essay
‘We Have No “Right to Happiness”’, published posthumously in December 1963. The title itself speaks volumes. I hope that the following analysis
will persuade those who remain unconvinced by my analysis of The Four
Loves, that even Lewis’s eros aims at happiness. We will also address the
question of whether this pursuit is essentially flawed and morally culpable.
Later, we will be able to return to, and conclude with, Nygren and what I
take is the heart of Lewis’s real dispute with him.
In his essay Lewis refutes the claim that people have a ‘right to happiness’. This, to him, sounds as odd as a right to good luck.28 As the back-

27
28

or it is the independence of the self, its exaltation above the vicissitudes of fortune; and so
forth.’
Quoted in N Y G R E N , Agape and Eros (see above, n. 2), 502.
L E W I S , ‘We Have No “Right to Happiness”’, in God in the Dock, ed. by Walter H O O P E R
(London: HarperCollins, 1998, 1st ed. 1971), 96: ‘For I believe – whatever one school of moralists may say – that we depend for a very great deal of our happiness or misery on circumstances outside all human control. A right to happiness doesn’t, for me, make much more sense
than a right to be six feet tall, or to have a millionaire for your father, or to get good weather
whenever you want to have a picnic.’ Hereafter all in-text citations of this essay are from this
edition of God in the Dock, using GiD for its abbreviation.
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drop for his analysis of a ‘right to happiness’ Lewis shares a story of a
certain marital drama ‘that once happened in [my] own neighbourhood’
(GiD, 95).
‘Mr A. had deserted Mrs A. and got his divorce in order to marry Mrs B., who had likewise got her divorce in order to marry Mr A. And there was certainly no doubt that Mr A. and
Mrs B. were very much in love with one another. If they continued to be in love, and if nothing
went wrong with their health or their income, they might reasonable expect to be very happy.’
(GiD, 95)

The details of this drama are illuminating, whether truly historical or
crafted to meet Lewis’s purposes. Lewis says that Mr A. and Mrs B. were
‘very much in love’. This is Lewis’s exact definition of eros in The Four
Loves.29 Eros is present. In this case the couple could ‘expect to be very
happy’. This implies, but does not necessarily prove, that happiness was
sought for. However, the rationale that Mr A. later offers as a moral alibi
for deserting his wife is telling: ‘But what could I do?’ he said. ‘A man has
the right to happiness. I had to take my one chance when it came’ (GiD,
96). Mr A. did what he did, because he wanted to be happy.
Not only this. It was clear that Mr A. and Mrs B. had not been happy
with their old partners.
‘Mrs B. had adored her husband at the outset. But then he got smashed up in the war. It
was thought that he had lost his virility, and it was known that he had lost his job. Life with
him was no longer what Mrs B. had bargained for. Poor Mrs A., too. She had lost her looks –
and all her liveliness. It might be true, as some said, that she consumed herself by bearing his
children and nursing him through the long illness that overshadowed their earlier married life.’
(95)

Loss of health, income, beauty, virility – we are reminded of the grim
list of want mentioned above. The first couple, the couple in The Four
Loves, would risk all just to be together. Lewis denied that they were seeking happiness. Mr A. and Mrs B., however, cannot bear their current state
of affairs – quite literally their affairs. They are unhappy. If the first couple
would ‘rather share unhappiness with the Beloved than be happy on any
other terms’, we might be well justified in saying that Mr A. and Mrs B.
would ‘rather share happiness with each other than remain unhappy on
the prevailing terms’.
Lewis laments the fact that, in the pursuit of happiness, especially sexual happiness, ‘every unkindness and breach of faith seems to be condoned’ (GiD, 99). Although he sees no good reason for giving erotic passion this privilege, he does see a strong cause.
‘It is part of the nature of a strong erotic passion – as distinct from a transient fit of
appetite – that it makes more towering promises than any other emotion. No doubt all our desires make promises, but not so impressively. To be in love involves the almost irresistible conviction that one will go on being in love until one dies, and that possession of the beloved will

29

L E W I S , Four Loves (see above, n. 19), 87.
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confer, not merely frequent ecstasies, but settled, fruitful, deep-rooted, lifelong happiness. Hence
all seems to be at stake. If we miss this chance we shall have lived in vain. At the very thought
of such doom we sink into fathomless depths of self-pity.’ (100, italics mine, except all)

Later Lewis acknowledges the obvious. The so-called ‘towering promises’ of happiness are often found to be untrue. Disillusion awaits further
down the road.30 But this is irrelevant to our discussion. What concerns us
here is Lewis’s candid acceptance of happiness, not only as a driving force
of eros, but as a dramatically powerful one.
Does Lewis here flatly contradict what he claimed in The Four Loves?
Certainly something odd is going on. We could defend Lewis against the
charge of contradiction if we could establish the two cases as incomparable. They could be incomparable for two reasons: the two stories might
involve either different ideas of happiness, or different ideas of love.
What kind of happiness is at stake, conventional happiness or meaningful happiness? Elements of conventional happiness are not difficult to
spot. We remember that the unhappiness with their previous spouses was
largely due to such misfortunes. Mrs B.’s husband had lost his job, perhaps
his virility, and Mr A.’s wife her looks and liveliness. To say ‘if nothing
went wrong with their health or their income’ (GiD, 95) implies that loss
of health and income would probably also dent the new happiness. Their
new-found happiness is fragile, but ironically phenomenologically experienced as enduring. Indeed, side by side with the conventional streak a deeper undercurrent is also detectable. In fact the two are hardly separable.
The lover believes that the possession of the beloved will confer ‘not
merely frequent ecstasies’, but also ‘settled, fruitful, deep-rooted, life-long
happiness’ (100) – clearly a meaningful kind of happiness.
This must be why ‘all’ seems to be at stake. Both conventional and
meaningful happiness are at stake. To miss this is to have lived ‘in vain’
(100). Thus, the two cases are dissimilar only insofar as the first cares less
for conventional happiness, a dissimilarity that is not enough to constitute
any significant contradiction. The weightier common denominator shared
by both is the fact that ‘meaningful happiness’ is sought for.
What, then, of love? We might, for instance, note the dissimilarities
between the descriptions of what ‘love’ in each case looks like. Is not the
second couple’s love closer to lust, mere sexual appetite, than to eros? Lewis speaks of ‘a strong erotic passion’ (GiD, 100), and what is aimed at is
a certain kind of happiness, ‘four bare legs in a bed’ (99). This kind of lust,
so goes the argument, can be directed to happiness, whereas true eros cannot. I find this explanation doubtful on several grounds. Although the centre of gravity admittedly falls on the Venus element of eros,31 the love in

30
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See L E W I S , God in the Dock (see above, n. 28), 100 – 101.
‘The carnal and animally sexual element in Eros, I intend (following an old usage) to call Venus’ (L E W I S , Four Loves [see above, n. 19], 87). Lewis is referring to a medieval allegorical
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question is still closer to eros than to mere lust. Firstly, as noted above, the
couple was ‘very much in love’ (95), which is Lewis’s precise definition of
eros in The Four Loves.32 Secondly, the narrative flows organically from
‘being in love’, to ‘a strong erotic passion’, to ‘emotion’, to ‘desire’, and
finally back to ‘being in love’ (100) – implying no division of or radical
impurity in love.33 Thirdly, the strong erotic passion carries an ‘almost irresistible conviction’ of permanence (100) – exactly what in The Four
Loves Lewis argues eros does, although what ‘is baffling is the combination of fickleness with his protestations of permanence’ (FL, 108). Lastly,
the passion is self-sacrificial. This last observation merits special attention.

V.

Eros’s Agapistic Opening

The passion’s self-sacrificing nature rules out another possible attempt
at classifying the loves as different in quality. I mean the suggestion that
whereas the first couple’s love leads to sacrifice, the second egocentrically
does not. I do not think this is true. Both involve sacrifice. Even what is
sacrificed is nearly identical in both. In the first case, love trumps the sacrifice of health, wealth, home, and honour – everything except the sacrifice
of the Beloved. In the second case, love trumps the sacrifice of the previous
marriage, perhaps parental relationships, and social reputation – everything
except the sacrifice of the new Beloved. In both cases to be with the Beloved is ‘better’ than to be without her on any other terms. Indeed, this is
exactly what according to Lewis eros is apt to do if given free reign. Eros
is ‘ready for every sacrifice except renunciation’ (FL, 103). By renunciation
is meant the sacrifice of eros itself.
Mr A. left his wife in order to marry Mrs B., because he had the right
to happiness. Lewis argues that the doubtful maxim ‘Everyone has the
right to happiness’ is really a misconstrual of the more correct ‘Everyone
has the right to pursue happiness by all lawful means’ (GiD, 97). The additions pursue and by all lawful means are crucial. Lewis is not arguing
that Mr A.’s action is wrong because he pursued happiness. There is nothing morally culpable in pursuing happiness, no matter what Nygren thinks.
If Mr A.’s action was condemnable, as Lewis thinks it was, it was so for
other reasons. He addresses the heart of the problem: ‘Mr A.’s action is an
offence against good faith (to solemn promises), against gratitude (towards

32
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distinction between Venus (sexual appetite) and Cupid (love), mentioned in his Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Literature (London: Oxford, 1958), 142.
L E W I S , Four Loves (see above, n. 19), 87.
Besides, Lewis objects strongly to the ‘popular idea that it is the absence or presence of Eros
which makes the sexual act “impure” or “pure”, degraded or fine, unlawful or lawful’ (L E W I S , Four Loves [see above, n. 19], 88), or alternatively that ‘Eros is “noblest” or “purest”
when Venus is reduced to the minimum’ (92).
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one to whom he was deeply indebted) and against common humanity’
(99).
The first couple is in love, apparently free to marry, and thus their
love is innocent. The second couple is also in love, married but not to each
other, and hence their love involves injustice – offence against good faith,
gratitude, and common humanity. I think this difference is insightful. It
provides the key to understanding the difference between the two couples
that brings clarity to the apparent confusion.
Here Lewis disagrees with yet another of Nygren’s claims, theologically perhaps the most important of all. Eros, contrary to what Nygren
thought, can be agapistic, can be self-sacrificing. The love of the first couple shows this admirably. Their love is willing to make towering sacrifices
to be together. And here lies, I believe, Lewis’s main concern in his reply
to Nygren in the The Four Loves. The love of the first couple shows eros’s
agapistic potential admirably – and is meant to show it. What Lewis found
revoltingly untrue is the concept of a ‘calculating’ eros that demotes the
Beloved simply to a means by which happiness is sought.34 To calculate
thus is to step outside the world of eros. ‘To Eros all these calculations are
irrelevant – just as the coolly brutal judgment of Lucretius is irrelevant to
Venus’ (FL, 102). Readers of Lewis must stress this irrelevancy of calculations of happiness, not the irrelevancy of happiness. While getting his
points across (to Sweden, perhaps), Lewis was driven to exaggeration in
denying eros’s happiness-seeking character altogether. As we have seen,
only ‘conventional happiness’ is irrelevant to his eros, not ‘meaningful happiness’.
By ‘the coolly brutal judgment of Lucretius’ Lewis is alluding to his
earlier account of eros’s relationship to pleasure. It is worth reproducing
here, because its logic applies well to happiness as well.
‘In some mysterious but quite indisputable fashion the lover desires the Beloved herself,
not the pleasure [or happiness] she can give. No lover in the world ever sought the embraces of
the woman he loved [or happiness] as a result of calculation, however unconscious, that they
would be more pleasurable than those of any other woman. If he raised the question he would,
no doubt, expect that this would be so. But to raise it would be to step outside the world of Eros
altogether. The only man I know of who ever did raise it was Lucretius, and he was certainly
not in love when he did.’ (FL, 90)

Eros does not instrumentalize the Beloved. That is part of what makes
it the most god-like of all the natural loves. ‘In one high bound it has overleaped the massive wall of our selfhood; it has made appetite itself altruistic, tossed personal happiness aside as a triviality and planted the interests
of another in the centre of our being’ (108). ‘If you asked [a man in love]
34

According to John Burnaby, such suspicion of eros, so strong in Nygren, is a result of ‘a complete misunderstanding of Augustine’s definition of frui’. See John B U R N A B Y , Amor Dei: A
Study of the Religion of St. Augustine (London: The Hulsean Lectures, 1947, 1st ed. 1938),
109.
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what he wanted, the true reply would often be, “To go on thinking of
her”’ (89). That is, he most certainly would not reply, ‘I have coolly calculated that, in pursuit of personal happiness, my best bet is to go on thinking about her.’ If he did answer thus, we could rightly question whether he
was in love at all. In addition to pleasure and happiness, Lewis discusses a
third possible ground for loving, namely, security. Of the three, this is the
least plausible. In ‘Charity’, the last chapter of The Four Loves, Lewis explains:
‘[W]ho could conceivably begin to love God on such prudential ground – because the security (so to speak) is better? Who could even include it among the grounds for loving? Would
you choose a wife or a Friend – if it comes to that, would you choose a dog – in this spirit? One
must be outside of the world of love, of all, loves, before one thus calculates. Eros, lawless Eros,
preferring the Beloved to happiness, is more like Love Himself than this.’ (115)

Lawless eros. With this we return to the second couple. Eros has an
agapistic opening. However, Lewis warns that in this opening lies its danger, too. He writes: ‘Of all the loves he is, at his height, most god-like;
therefore most prone to demand our worship. Of himself he always tends
to turn “being in love” into a sort of religion’ (FL, 105). ‘We must not
give unconditional obedience to the voice of Eros when he speaks most like
a god’ (104). ‘Eros, honoured without reservation and obeyed unconditionally, becomes a demon’ (105). ‘Eros extenuates – almost sanctifies – any
actions it leads to’ (106), and ‘speaking with that very grandeur and displaying that very transcendence of self, may urge to evil as well as to good’
(102). The second couple exemplifies this danger – and is meant to exemplify it. Eros has become a demon, and in promise of happiness, it has
lured Mr A. and Mrs B. into an act of injustice, into sin.35

VI.

Conclusion

The four claims of Nygren’s ‘eudæmonistic scheme’ were: (1) Eros always seeks the happiness of the lover, and (2) this happiness-seeking character is morally culpable, because (3) it entails selfish incapability of agapistic sacrifice, and (4) calculatingly demotes the Beloved to a means to
this end. C. S. Lewis explicitly disagrees with all of them, although he is
finally compelled to refine his objection to the first. In Nygren’s mind,
these four claims are not only interconnected but also organic: they stand
or wither together. Not so for Lewis. The jump from (1) to (2) is precisely
35

‘But what could I do?’ asked Mr A. (L E W I S , God in the Dock [see above, n. 28], 96). Zealous
for eros, lovers sometimes even ‘feel like martyrs’ (L E W I S , Four Loves [see above, n. 19],
107), and ‘can say to one another in an almost sacrificial spirit, “It is for love’s sake that I have
neglected my parents – left my children – cheated my partner – failed my friend at his greatest
need”. […] The votaries may even come to feel a particular merit in such sacrifices; what costlier offering can be laid on love’s altar than one’s conscience?’ (108)
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that: a jump. Only a conviction that believed all human inclinations are
‘tainted by selfishness’ could allow it.36 Such a conviction (which could be
called ‘pretheological’37) Lewis simply does not share. Thus, by accepting
the first claim, he is not committed to the second which in turn has natural
affinities with the third and fourth.
Nonetheless, I think we must confess that in arguing against Nygren,
Lewis was driven to hyperbole (a habit that in all fairness Nygren was not
impervious to either). What remained amiss in The Four Loves is luckily
corrected by the overall argument in ‘We Have No “Right to Happiness”’.
Whether this was done intentionally or not, we cannot be sure. Although
only three years separate the publication of the two, my reading of the
essay reveals no deliberate reference to The Four Loves. I am inclined to
believe that Lewis’s corrective was inadvertent. His conscious motives lay
entirely elsewhere. The undertone of his essay suggests latent frustration
with the ‘hijacking’ of eros as a moral alibi in shirking responsibility.38 But
we must add a caveat: It might be uncharitable to say that something was
‘amiss’ in The Four Loves. ‘Happiness’ in English is used in so many ways
that it almost inevitably raises some of the issues we have taken up. This
may be seen less as evidence of confusion, much less of possible contradiction, on Lewis’s part than just built into the notion. Nobody, after all,
knows how to translate Aristotle’s eudæmonia.
In his book on love, the German Thomist philosopher Josef Pieper
offers an instructive account of the relationship of eros to both happiness
and unhappiness. Reading Nygren’s Agape and Eros left also Pieper very
‘much perplexed’; of all the defamations of eros it is ‘the most radical’.39
Pieper calls C. S. Lewis ‘the great lay theologian of the present day’ (218)
and summons him to the arena repeatedly to answer Nygren with his
‘magnificent metaphysical common sense’ (258).40 For instance, love’s intimate connection to sorrow has been known and expressed, ‘of course, in
C. S. Lewis’s book on love [The Four Loves], which we have already
36

37

38

39
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According to William O’Connor, a strict Kantian deontologism accounts for this conviction in
Nygren’s thought. See William O ’ C O N N O R , ‘The uti/frui Distinction in Augustian Ethics’, in
Augustinian Studies (1983), 49.
According to Josef Pieper, defamators of eros bring a ‘pretheological conception of man’ to the
discussion. By this he means that they bring a fixed anthropology to the study of Scripture
instead of finding Scripture’s anthropology. See P I E P E R , Love (see above, n. 21), 210 – 211.
What is more, Lewis worries that in a society where conjugal infidelity is tolerated, women will
more often be the victims than the culprits: ‘I have no sympathy with moralists who frown at
the increasing crudity of female provocativeness. These signs of desperate competition fill me
with pity’ (GiD, 101). For a discussion on the problem of ‘hijacking’ love, see Olli-Pekka V A I N I O , ‘The Aporia of Using “Love” as an Argument: A Meditation on C. S. Lewis’s The Four
Loves’, in The Chronicle of the University of Oxford C. S. Lewis Society, vol. 4, no. 2 (2007),
21 – 30.
P I E P E R , Love (see above, n. 21), 214, 211.
As far as the Catholic Pieper is concerned, Lewis belongs to the ‘orthodox tradition’ with such
giants as Augustine and Aquinas (208).
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quoted several times’ (229). Curiously enough, however, Pieper does not
mention Lewis’s denial of eros’s happiness-seeking character. Pieper takes
for granted the ‘essential relationship that connects happiness and joy with
love’, although joy ‘is by nature something secondary’, because it would be
‘of course foolish to ask someone “why” he wants to rejoice’ (224). The
most truthful answer would be: ‘Because we love to love!’ (226).
If the indivisibility of love and happiness is not a delusion, neither is
the indivisibility of love and unhappiness. In fact, lovers alone can be unhappy, due to the vulnerability of love as expressed by Lewis above. Pieper
asks the obvious question: ‘Then where do we stand? Do both principles
apply simultaneously: love and joy belong together, but love and sorrow
likewise – just as Thomas Aquinas says with his cool objectivity: “Ex
amore procedit et gaudium et tristitia”, “out of loves comes both joy and
sadness”?’ (229). Pieper’s answer to this seeming paradox summarizes our
whole discussion rather charmingly: ‘Even the unhappy lover is happier
than the nonlover, with whom the lover would never change place’
(230).41

SUMMARY
Anders Nygren’s antithetical juxtaposition of eros and agape became enormously influential in twentieth-century Protestant theology. Among other interconnected tenets, Nygren promulgated the idea that eros is eudæmonistic, i.e. always seeking the happiness of the lover. In
The Four Loves (1960), C. S. Lewis vehemently denies this. Lewis’s use of the word ‘happiness’
in The Four Loves is so close to Nygren’s eudæmonism that Risto Saarinen has called it ‘a conscious showdown’. In this article I evaluate this engagement. After presenting and deconstructing
it, I challenge Lewis’s argument. I argue that eros does, as Nygren claims it does, seek happiness
– although not only this. Perhaps surprisingly, Lewis, despite all appearances, may actually be
compelled to agree with Nygren on this point. But not on every point. The final analysis reveals
what I take to be Lewis’s true concern. Contrary to what Nygren thought, for Lewis, the pursuit
of happiness is not morally culpable and even eros has an agapistic opening. While getting these
points across, Lewis was driven to exaggeration in denying eros’s happiness-seeking character
altogether. This exaggeration is corrected (probably inadvertently) by the overall argument of his
last, posthumously published essay, ‘We Have No “Right to Happiness”’ (1963).

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Anders Nygren‘s antithetische Gegenüberstellung von Eros und Agape beeinflusste die protestantische Theologie des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts enorm. Nygren verbreitete, neben weiteren
im Zusammenhang stehenden Lehren, den Gedanken, dass Eros eudämonistisch sei, d.h. ständig
auf der Suche nach dem Glück des Liebenden. C. S. Lewis bestreitet dies in The Four Loves
(1960) vehement. Lewis’ Verwendung des Wortes “Glück” in The Four Loves kommt der Bedeutung von Nygrens Eudämonismus so nahe, dass Risto Saarinen dies als “eine bewusste Macht-
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I would like to thank Risto Saarinen and Gilbert Meilaender for helpful conversations in working out eros’s relation to happiness in Lewis.
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probe” bezeichnet. In diesem Artikel werde ich dieses Unterfangen näher untersuchen. Nach Darlegung und Auswertung der Behauptung von Lewis, stelle ich diese in Frage. Ich behaupte, dass
Eros, wie Nygren ebenfalls anführt, auf der Suche nach dem Glück ist – und nicht nur das. Es
überrascht vielleicht, dass Lewis Trotz allem Anschein gezwungen ist Nygren in diesem Punkt
beizupflichten. Aber nicht in jedem Punkt. Erst die endgültige Auswertung zeigt, was ich als das
wahre Anliegen von Lewis betrachte. Im Gegensatz zu Nygren, ist für Lewis das Streben nach
Glück moralisch nicht sträflich und selbst Eros hat eine agapistische Öffnung. Beim Versuch den
Standpunkt klar zu machen wurde Lewis zur Übertreibung angetrieben den Glück suchenden
Charakter von Eros zu leugnen. Diese Übertreibung wird (vermutlich versehentlich) durch die
gesamte Argumentation seines letzten, nach dem Tod veröffentlichten Aufsatz ‘We Have No
“Right to Happiness”’ (1963) berichtigt.

